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Chapter 8
Mortality Risk, Inflation Risk, and
Annuity Products
Jeffrey R. Brown, Olivia S. Mitchell, and James M.
Poterba

‘‘Buy an annuity cheap, and make your life interesting to yourself and
everybody else that watches the speculation.’’ ( Jonas Chuzzlewit to his
father, in Martin Chuzzlewit by Charles Dickens)

Future retirees are likely to shoulder an increasing share of the burden of
managing their wealth after they leave the labor force. This is primarily the
result of the rapid growth of self-directed retirement accounts. Poterba,
Venti, and Wise (∞ΩΩΩ) project that the average retiree balance in ∂≠∞(k)
accounts will rise tenfold between ≤≠≠≠ and ≤≠≥≠. The popularity of selfmanaged retirement resources is further supported by U.S. corporate pension plans permitting, and in some cases even encouraging, lump sum distributions when participants retire. Interest in retiree responsibility for
asset decumulation has also emerged in policy discussions of ‘‘individual
account’’ programs that could supplement or replace government-provided
social security. As the leading edge of the baby boom approaches retirement, more attention is likely to be directed toward the development of
ﬁnancial products such as annuities that provide households with a structure way to draw down the assets that they have accumulated during their
working lives.
Annuities feature prominently in theoretical discussions of asset decumulation in life cycle models, so it has been disappointing to economists that,
in practice, the market for privately purchased annuities in the United
States is very small. Most elderly households in the U.S. receive governmentprovided social security beneﬁts that provide an inﬂation-indexed lifetime
annuity. Many also receive a nominal annuity from a deﬁned beneﬁt company pension plan. But few elderly households in the U.S. convert their
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ﬁnancial assets accumulated outside a deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan into an
annuity providing a lifetime retirement income. The Life Insurance Marketing Research Association (LIMRA, ∞ΩΩΩ) reported that in ∞ΩΩ∫ there were
only ∞.∑∏ million individual annuity policies in ‘‘payout’’ phase, meaning
that the policy owners were currently receiving beneﬁts. These policies covered a total of ≤.≥∑ million lives, since many of the policies were joint and
survivor annuities paying beneﬁts to both members of a married couple.
A number of previous studies have investigated the demand for annuity
products and evaluated various aspects of annuity pricing (cf. Friedman and
Warshawsky ∞ΩΩ≠, and Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown ∞ΩΩΩ;
hereafter MPWB). In the current study, we present new evidence on the
pricing of annuity products in the United States and several other countries.
We focus on three issues. First, we offer new computations on the ‘‘money’s
worth’’ of nominal annuities, the present value of annuity payouts relative to
their purchase price, in the United States during the late ∞ΩΩ≠s. Our ﬁndings broadly conﬁrm previous results that suggest money’s worth values
between ∫≠ and Ω≠ cents per premium dollar for randomly selected individuals in the population, but values between Ω≠ cents and one dollar for the
average annuitant. Second, we assess the U.S. market for real annuities,
annuities that offer a payout stream indexed to the price level. There is
effectively no market for inﬂation-protected annuities in the United States,
but there are active markets in other nations, notably the United Kingdom.
Third, we summarize available evidence on annuity pricing in other nations.
We describe some of the shortcomings of studies that have analyzed prices
in annuity markets outside the United States and the United Kingdom, and
we note the difﬁculties associated with obtaining key data inputs for these
studies.

The Market for Annuities in the United States
Annuities may be purchased either by members of a group or by individuals.
In this analysis we focus on individual policies. These are most directly
relevant for older people who might wish to use the annuity market to
spread their accumulated assets over a remaining lifetime of uncertain
length. By contrast, a group annuity contract is typically obtained via an
employer-provided deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan. In some cases, group annuities may also be obtained via a deﬁned contribution pension plan. The
key distinction between an annuity purchased as an individual and one
obtained through a group is that individuals purchasing annuities on their
own are more likely to be self-selected to live longer than average. As in
other insurance contexts, group purchases of annuities reduce the risk of
adverse selection. In the present paper, we focus on individual annuities as a
means to manager retirement assets outside pension plans.
The U.S. individual annuity market is one component of the broader
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market for life insurance products. The American Council on Life Insurance (ACLI ∞ΩΩΩ) reports that premiums paid for immediate individual annuities, which are our main focus, totaled $π.Ω billion in ∞ΩΩ∫. By comparison, premiums for immediate group annuities totaled $∞∏.≥ billion, and
premiums for group deferred annuities, typically representing contributions
to deﬁned beneﬁt pension accounts, were $∞∞π.π billion. Further, the $π.Ω
billion ﬁgure for individual annuity premiums overstates the importance of
annuity products in retirement, since about half of all newly purchased
individual annuities represent ‘‘structured settlements’’ (typically resulting
from legal cases) and hence do not represent income ﬂows to retirees.
Moreover, of the remaining ‘‘annuities,’’ half are ‘‘period certain’’ policies.
These policies promise a ﬁxed nominal payout stream for a speciﬁed time
period without a mortality contingency; they are effectively bonds issued by
insurance companies. Thus, premium ﬂows for annuity products providing
lifetime income from an initial asset stock are currently only about $≤ billion
per year.
Premium volume for individual immediate annuities is dwarfed by that for
individual deferred annuities. Deferred products attracted $∫π.∑ billion in
premiums in ∞ΩΩ∫, mostly for purchases of variable annuities during the
preretirement period. It is not clear whether the assets that accumulate in
these ﬁnancial instruments will ultimately be used to ﬁnance the purchase
of traditional immediate annuities. Survey results presented by the Gallup
Organization (∞ΩΩΩ) suggest that many purchasers of variable annuities
regard the accumulating principal in these products as a source of emergency resources for health care or other needs, not as a source of stable
retirement income.
Although the U.S. individual annuity market is currently small, it is likely
to grow substantially in the future. Many current retirement saving vehicles
permit individuals to exert substantial discretion over how they draw down
their accumulated assets. These vehicles include ∂≠∞(k) plans, ∂≠≥(b) plans,
and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Potential draw-down options
from these include lump-sum distributions, periodic partial distributions,
and annuitization. Brown (∞ΩΩΩ) reports that data for individuals aged ∑∞–
∏∞ from the Health and Retirement Survey suggest that ∂∫ percent of households with a deﬁned contribution pension plan permitting a phased withdraw or annuity option intend to annuitize at least a portion of their account.
When coupled with the rapid prospective growth in the number of retirees
who will have participated in a deﬁned contribution plan during their working lifetime, this should yield signiﬁcant future growth in the annuity market.
While the number of future retirees who will have resources that could be
annuitized is likely to increase in the future, it is possible that the percentage
of retirees with such accounts who choose to annuitize will decline, at least if
current stock market valuation levels persist. Individuals reaching retirement age with large accumulations in retirement accounts may feel less
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need for annuity-type products to product them against outliving their resources than would less wealthy retirees. The increase in share values in
recent years, and the associated rise in the value of retirement account
assets, has apparently affected the demand for annuity products. At one
major retirement annuity provider, TIAA-CREF, King (∞ΩΩ∏) reports that
retirees who control their assets have been gradually shifting away from
annuity distributions and toward lump sum options. A different study at the
same ﬁrm by Ameriks (∞ΩΩΩ) reports that participants with larger account
balances tend to choose the lump sum route for distributing plan assets.
Even if the fraction of deﬁned contribution plan participants selecting annuities declines somewhat in the future, the fact that the retiree population with self-directed accounts is growing rapidly still suggests prospective
growth in the annuity market.

Valuing U.S. Annuity Products
We now consider the set of nominal annuity products currently available to
annuity buyers in the United States. We also develop a framework for evaluating the payouts from annuity products by calculating the ratio of the
expected present discounted value of such payouts to the purchase cost
(initial premium) of these products. In the next section we report empirical
results based on this framework.

Currently Available Annuity Products in the United States
Virtually all the annuity products marketed to individual annuity buyers in
the United States are nominal annuities. They pay beneﬁts that are not
inﬂation-indexed. Two forms are common: (a) level-payout annuities that
provide a ﬁxed payment, typically monthly, for as long as the annuitant is
alive; and (b) graded annuities paying beneﬁts that increase over time at a
prespeciﬁed rate (e.g. at ≥ or ∑ percent per year). The payout streams
associated with these two types of policies differ, with the real value of payouts from a level-payout nominal policy declining faster than that from a
graded annuity. A graded annuity does not offer inﬂation protection, however, since the stream of beneﬁts provided is not affected by the inﬂation
rate over the contract’s lifetime.
An annuity may be purchased as either an individual policy or a joint and
survivor policy. In the former case, in the absence of a period-certain clause,
beneﬁt payments continue as long as the insured person is alive. In the latter
case, beneﬁts are paid for as long as either of two individuals is alive. Brown
and Poterba (≤≠≠∞) explain that joint and survivor products vary in the ratio
of the payout that second to die annuitant receives relative to the payout
when both annuitants are alive. There are three common types of joint and
survivor products, and several variants. One, a ‘‘∞≠≠ percent survivor policy,’’
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provides the same beneﬁt when both members of a couple are alive as when
only one survives. A related policy, a ‘‘∑≠ percent survivor policy,’’ provides
the survivor with half of the beneﬁt that was paid when both annuitants were
alive. The third common policy is a ‘‘∑≠ percent contingent beneﬁciary
policy.’’ In this case, one of the annuitants is deﬁned as the primary and the
other as the contingent beneﬁciary. The full amount of the annuity payout
continues for as long as the primary beneﬁciary is alive. If the primary
beneﬁciary predeceases the contingent beneﬁciary, the contingent beneﬁciary receives a payout equal to half of the primary beneﬁciary’s payout.
A ﬁnal factor affecting annuity products is their tax status, which has to do
with the source of the funds used to purchase the annuity. In the U.S.,
contributions to employer-provided pension programs are not included in
taxable income provided that the plan meets regulatory standards. In this
paper, we focus on annuities purchased using nonqualiﬁed funds.∞
Table ∞ reports the average annuity payouts available to ∏∑-year-old annuity buyers in the United States over the period ∞ΩΩ∑–ΩΩ. For comparability purposes, the table reports only on annuities with a premium of
$∞≠≠,≠≠≠; the data represent single premium, nonparticipating, annuities.
Premiums are reported gross of state premium taxes. By restricting the
sample to nonparticipating annuities, we exclude annuity products for
which the payout to the annuitant depends on either the investment returns
or the mortality experience of the insurance company writing the policy.
TIAA-CREF is an example of a ﬁrm that sells participating annuities, and
that is therefore excluded from our sample.
Data for the period ∞ΩΩ∑–Ω∫ are drawn from the Life/Health edition of
Best’s Review. For many years this major publisher of insurance market information conducted an annual survey of single premium immediate annuity
policies, but it ceased doing so in ∞ΩΩ∫. The Best’s survey generally included
around ∞≠≠ ﬁrms with consistent representation from the larger national
insurers, along with many small companies with a strong regional presence.
Table ∞ also reports information from ∞ΩΩ∫ and ∞ΩΩΩ from the Annuity
Shopper, which is a print and electronic publication providing annuity price
quotes to prospective buyers. The Annuity Shopper has collected information
on annuity prices since the early ∞Ω∫≠s. This publication does not offer a
representative sample of insurers; rather, listing with the Annuity Shopper is at
the discretion of the insurer. In ∞ΩΩ∫ there were ΩΩ ﬁrms in the Best’s database, compared with ≥∑ ﬁrms in the Annuity Shopper database. It is interesting that for the overlap year of ∞ΩΩ∫, average monthly annuity payouts agree
quite closely across the two sources.
The evidence in Table ∞ suggests that annuity payouts have declined in
the United States between ∞ΩΩ∑ and ∞ΩΩΩ. For instance, a ∏∑-year-old man
purchasing a $∞≠≠,≠≠≠ single premium annuity in ∞ΩΩ∑ would expect to receive a monthly payment of $πΩ∂ on average ($Ω,∑≤∫ per year). By ∞ΩΩ∫, the
nominal payout would have dropped by ∫ percent to $π≥≥ ($∫,πΩ∏ per year).
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Table 1. Average Monthly Payouts from Single Premium Immediate Annuities
Offered to ∏∑-Year-Olds, United States, ∞ΩΩ∑–ΩΩ
Annuity Shopper

Best’s Survey

Male Annuitant
Female Annuitant

∞ΩΩ∑

∞ΩΩ∏

∞ΩΩπ

∞ΩΩ∫

∞ΩΩ∫

∞ΩΩΩ

$πΩ∂.∞≤
π∞∏.Ω∫

π∏∞.πΩ
∏∫∑.∏≤

ππ≤.≤≤
∏ΩΩ.∏π

π≥≤.π∂
∏∏∞.∏≤

π≥∞.Ω∂
∏∑Ω.≤Ω

π≥∂.ππ
∏∏π.≥∏

Source: Authors’ tabulations from Best’s Review (various issues) and Annuity Shopper of payouts
for nonqualiﬁed individual annuity purchases. Monthly payouts are based on a $∞≠≠,≠≠≠ initial premium.

Women live longer than men on average, so the ∏∑-year-old female paying
the same $∞≠≠,≠≠≠ premium in ∞ΩΩ∑ would have anticipated receiving about
∞≠ percent less than her male counterpart, $π∞π per month ($∫,∏≠∂ per
year). By ∞ΩΩ∫, her nominal beneﬁt would also have fallen by ∫ percent or to
$∏∏≤ per month ($π,Ω∂∂).
Table ∞ does not present information on joint and survivor annuities, but
we have also examined data on those products to place them in perspective.
In ∞ΩΩΩ, for instance, a couple consisting of a ∏∑-year-old male and a ∏≤-yearold female buying a joint and full survivor annuity would receive $∑∫π
monthly, about ≤≠ percent less than a single male.
The Annuity Shopper and Best’s data appear to compare reasonably well in
∞ΩΩ∫, the year for which we present summary measures from both data sets.
If we extend the time series of annuity payouts for ∏∑-year-old men to ∞ΩΩΩ
using the Annuity Shopper data, the average monthly payout for the ∏∑-yearold annuity purchaser falls by around ∫ percent over the ∞ΩΩ∑–ΩΩ period. It
is likely that this fall in monthly payouts is partly attributable to the decline
in nominal long-term interest rates of over ∞≠≠ basis points that occurred
between ∞ΩΩ∑ and ∞ΩΩΩ.
The information on mean monthly annuity payouts shown in Table ∞
does not reﬂect the substantial variation across insurance companies in the
montly payouts offered. MPWB (∞ΩΩΩ) report that different insurance companies can vary widely in their annuity payouts, and that these payout differences do not appear to be systematically related to factors such as insurance
company ratings. This implies that some annuity purchasers may receive
payouts substantially different from the average values shown in Table ∞.

Valuing Annuity Payouts: The ‘‘Money’s Worth’’ Calculation
Annuity products provide a stream of payouts lasting many years. The exact
value of this payout stream is uncertain because it is conditional on an
individual annuity buyer’s longevity. In order to evaluate how the future
annuity stream compares with the current price of an annuity product, we
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must therefore undertake an expected present discounted value calculation
to account for the future payment stream and annuity buyer’s mortality
risk. The ‘‘money’s worth’’ valuation approach we undertake here builds on
prior research including Warshawsky (∞Ω∫∫), Friedman and Warshawsky
(∞ΩΩ≠), Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (∞ΩΩΩ), and Brown,
Mitchell, and Poterba (≤≠≠∞). Speciﬁcally, the formula used to calculate the
expected present discounted valued (EPDV) of a nominal annuity with an
annual payout An, purchased by an individual of age b is:

冘

∞∞∑ – b

(∞)

Vb(An ) =

j=∞

An * P j
.
兿
(∞ + ik )
j
k=∞

We assume that no annuity buyer lives beyond age ∞∞∑. Pj denotes the probability that an individual of age b years at the time of the annuity purchase
survives for at least j years after buying the annuity. The variable ik denotes
the one-year nominal interest rate k years after the annuity purchase. We
value annuities without regard to the tax consequences of receiving annuity
income, in part for comparability with previous literature, and in part because calculations in MPWB (∞ΩΩΩ) suggest that there is little difference in
the money’s worth ratio calculated before and after taxes.
In the U.S. market, virtually all annuities sold offer only nominal payout streams, but in other countries, real annuities that provide inﬂationindexed payout streams are also available. To compute the EPDV for such
products, equation (∞) must be modiﬁed to recognize that the amount of
the payout is time-varying in nominal terms but ﬁxed in real terms. The
easiest way to handle this is to allow A r to denote the real annual payout, and
to replace the nominal interest rates in the denominator of (∞) with corresponding real interest rates. We use rk to denote the annual real interest rate
k years after the annuity purchase. While historically it was difﬁcult to measure real interest rates without some assumptions about the future course
of inﬂation rates, it may be possible to use data on the interest rates on
inﬂation-indexed bonds in the United States and the United Kingdom to
obtain direct estimates of these rates. The expression that we evaluate to
compute the EPDV of a real annuity is

冘

∞∞∑ – b

(≤)

Vb(Ar ) =

j=∞

Ar * P j
.
兿
(∞ + rk )
j
k=∞

The ‘‘money’s worth’’ of an annuity is deﬁned as the ratio of the expected
present value of the annuity’s payouts and its purchase price. For a nominal
annuity that costs $∞≠≠,≠≠≠, for example, the money’s worth is Vb(An )/
∞≠≠,≠≠≠. Our discussion focuses on money’s worth ratios because they
provide a scale-free metric for comparing annuities over time or across
countries.
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Money’s Worth Calculations for Nominal Annuities
The framework developed above can be used to calculate the money’s worth
for a variety of different nominal annuity products. To calculate expected
present discounted values based on equations (∞) and (≤), we require three
types of data input. The ﬁrst is the payout rate on the annuities being
valued, which was reported in Table ∞. The second is a set of mortality rates
that can be used to calculate the probability that an annuitant will be alive in
future years. The third is a set of discount rates. We describe our choices for
these assumptions and then present our empirical EPDV calculations.

Mortality Assumptions for Annuity Valuation
Equations (∞) and (≤) are evaluated using mortality tables drawn either for
the population as a whole, or for a subset of annuitants. The ﬁrst set of
results uses survival probabilities for the population at large, and for this we
rely on birth cohort mortality rates taken from the Social Security Administration’s ∞ΩΩΩ Trustees’ Report (∞ΩΩΩ). It is not sufﬁcient to use current
period mortality tables, since over time populations generally experience
mortality improvements. Annuity valuation requires mortality projections
that model the prospective survival experience of today’s retirees. When estimating the money’s worth of an annuity for a ∏∑-year-old in ∞ΩΩ∑, we therefore use the projected mortality experience of the ∞Ω≥≠ birth cohort, since
this is the group that would have been ∏∑ years old in ∞ΩΩ∑. Similarly, we use
the ∞Ω≥∞ through ∞Ω≥∂ birth cohort mortality rates for the ∞ΩΩ∏ through
∞ΩΩΩ money’s worth calculations.
The second set of results acknowledges that annuity purchasers tend to
have a mortality experience that differs from that of the general population.
Whether this is the result of those who have information that they are likely
to be long-lived purchasing annuities, or simply a function of different (and
potentially observable) characteristics of annuitants and nonannuitants, is
not clear. In any case, because annuitants have longer life expectancies than
the broader population, insurance companies have developed a second set
of mortality rates. This annuitant mortality table describes the mortality
experience of those who actually purchase annuities. MPWB (∞ΩΩΩ) develop
an algorithm that combines information from the Annuity ≤≠≠≠ mortality
table described in Johansen (∞ΩΩ∏), the ∞Ω∫≥ Individual Annuitant Mortality table, and the projected rate of mortality improvement implicit in the
difference between the Social Security Administration’s cohort and period
mortality tables for the population. Our algorithm generates projected mortality rates for the set of annuitants purchasing annuity contracts in a given
year. Our calculations use an updated version of that algorithm that incorporates the most recent social security data.
The population and annuitant mortality tables differ substantially. Fig-
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ure ∞ shows the projected mortality rates in ∞ΩΩΩ for ∏∑-year old male annuity buyers and ∏∑-year-old men in the population at large. Between the
ages of ∏∑ and π∑, the mortality rate for annuitants is roughly half of that for
the general population. The mortality differential is somewhat smaller at
older ages. Because cash ﬂows in the ﬁrst few years after annuity purchase
contribute importantly to determining the expected present discounted
value (EPDV) of the annuity payout, the large mortality differential between ∏∑ and π∑ generates signiﬁcant differences in EPDVs when we switch
from one mortality table to another.

Discount Rate Assumptions for Annuity Valuation
In equation (∞) above, the term ik denotes the one-year interest rate k years
after the annuity purchase. In our baseline calculations, we measure these
interest rates using the term structure of yields for zero-coupon U.S. Treasury ‘‘strips.’’ We estimate the pattern of interest rates that are implied by
these yields. The data on the U.S. Treasury strips yield curve were collected
from Bloomberg Financial Markets for the same dates on which the Best’s Review and Annuity Shopper data were collected. These are riskless interest
rates, and using them to discount future annuity payouts implicitly assumes
that there is no default risk associated with these payouts. The argument for
using such discount rates is that insurance regulation makes the default risk
for annuity providers very low. In most states, annuity buyers are protected
against insurance company defaults through state insolvency funds. While
these funds do not make all annuity purchases riskless, they do further
reduce the chance that an annuity buyer will not receive the promised
payouts.
One can argue, however, that riskless interest rates generate discount
rates that are too low, particularly from the standpoint of the insurance
companies that offer annuities. Life insurance ﬁrms generally invest their
portfolios in risky bonds, so the return at which the insurers may discount
their liabilities may exceed the riskless rate. To explore the sensitivity of our
ﬁndings with respect to alternative interest rate assumptions, we also calculate discount rates from the term structure for BAA corporate bonds. These
rates were also taken from Bloomberg on the same dates as the annuity price
quotes, and correspond to a Bloomberg bond rating of BBB-≤. The risk
premium associated with these bonds varies with maturity, and over the ﬁve
years of our sample period. However, the typical yields of these corporate
securities at a ≥≠-year horizon are approximately Ω≠–∞∂≠ basis points higher
than comparable yields on riskless Treasury bonds of the same maturity.
The yield spread at shorter maturities is in the π≠–∞≠≠ basis point range.
Using a market-based term structure for interest rates on risky bonds
represents a methodological advance relative to previous work on annuity
valuation. Early studies of the value of annuity payouts used a single dis-

Figure ∞. U.S. annuitant and population mortality. Source: Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (∞ΩΩΩ),
with updates as described in the text.
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Table 2. Money’s Worth of Single Premium Immediate Annuities Offered to ∏∑Year-Olds, United States, ∞ΩΩ∑–ΩΩ
Mortality
Table

Best’s
Survey

Annuity
Shopper

Term
Structure

∞ΩΩ∑

∞ΩΩ∏

∞ΩΩπ

∞ΩΩ∫

∞ΩΩ∫

∞ΩΩΩ

Men
Population
Population
Annuitant
Annuitant

Treasury
Corporate
Treasury
Corporate

≠.∫≥≠
≠.πΩ≠
≠.Ω≥π
≠.∫∫∑

≠.∫≤∞
≠.π∫≥
≠.Ω≤Ω
≠.∫πΩ

≠.∫≥π
≠.∫≠≠
≠.Ω≥∫
≠.∫Ω∞

≠.∫∑∑
≠.∫≠∫
≠.Ωπ∂
≠.Ω∞≥

≠.∫∂∂
≠.πΩ∫
≠.Ω∏≠
≠.Ω≠≠

≠.∫∑≤
≠.π∫≥
≠.Ωπ≠
≠.∫∫∞

Women
Population
Population
Annuitant
Annuitant

Treasury
Corporate
Treasury
Corporate

≠.∫∂≠
≠.πΩ≥
≠.Ω≠Ω
≠.∫∑∂

≠.∫≤Ω
≠.π∫∂
≠.∫ΩΩ
≠.∫∂∏

≠.∫∂Ω
≠.∫≠∏
≠.Ω≤∞
≠.∫π≠

≠.∫π≤
≠.∫∞∫
≠.Ω∑≥
≠.∫∫∫

≠.∫∑π
≠.∫≠∂
≠.Ω≥∏
≠.∫π≤

≠.∫π≤
≠.πΩ≤
≠.Ω∑≤
≠.∫∑∫

Source: Authors’ tabulations as described in the text.

count rate, typically the interest rate on a ten-year government or corporate
bond, to discount annuity payouts. MPWB (∞ΩΩΩ) used a market-based term
structure for riskless bonds, but constructed a synthetic term structure for
risky bonds by adding a constant risk premium to the riskless interest rates.
There is currently some variation in the yield spread between corporate and
government bonds at different maturities, so the most accurate approach is
one that exploits the actual term structure of corporate and government
interest rates.

New Results on the Money’s Worth of Nominal Annuities in the
United States
Table ≤ presents our central ﬁndings regarding the money’s worth of nominal annuities in the U.S. market. The table presents results for both men
and women purchasing annuities at age ∏∑, and the table shows money’s
worth calculations using (a) both the Treasury yield curve and the corporate bond yield curve, and (b) both population and annuitant mortality
tables. To illustrate how to interpret the ﬁnings, consider the ∞ΩΩΩ Annuity
Shopper results. For a ∏∑-year-old man purchasing a $∞≠≠,≠≠≠ annuity using
funds accumulated outside a qualiﬁed retirement account, our results suggest that annuity payouts have an expected value of $∫∑,≤≠≠ using the Treasury yield curve for discounting, and $π∫,≥≠≠ with the BAA corporate yield
curve. These values translate into money’s worth ratios of ≠.∫∑≤ and ≠.π∫≥
respectively; these are the values shown in the table. These calculations are
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based on the population mortality table. If the annuity purchaser faced
mortality rates corresponding to the typical annuity buyer, then the EPDV
of payouts rises to $Ωπ,≠≠≠ (with the Treasury yield curve) or $∫∫,∞≠≠ (with
the corporate yield curve). Corresponding money’s worth ratios for women
are ≠.∫π≤ or ≠.πΩ≤ with the population mortality rates, and ≠.Ω∑≤ and ≠.∫∑∫,
respectively, with annuitant tables.
Table ≤ shows that there has been a small rise in money’s worth of individual annuities over the ∞ΩΩ∑–ΩΩ period when we compute EPDV using the
Treasury yield curve. There is virtually no change in the money’s worth
ratio, however, when we use the corporate yield curve for valuation. This
reﬂects a slight widening of the yield spread between Tresury and corporate
bonds over the period in question, particularly from ∞ΩΩ∫ to ∞ΩΩΩ. These
ﬁndings are consistent with insurance companies pricing annuity products
using risky interest rates.

Real Annuity Offerings in the United States: What Are
the Options?
Our discussion of annuity products thus far has focused on nominal annuities. One disadvantage of this type of annuity is that it exposes buyers to
the risk of unexpected inﬂation, which can cut the real value of their beneﬁts and leave them late in retirement with a substantially lower than expected standard of living. In other nations, notably the United Kingdom,
there is a well developed market for annuities that offer inﬂation-indexed
payout. In the United States, even though inﬂation-indexed Treasury bonds
have been available since ∞ΩΩπ, there is still virtually no market for inﬂationindexed annuities. We now summarize the types of inﬂation-indexed annuity products that are available in the United States, drawing on Brown,
Mitchell, and Poterba (≤≠≠≠).
To date we have identiﬁed only two annuity products in the U.S. that offer
substantial inﬂation protection to retirees. The ﬁrst is the ‘‘Freedom CPI
Indexed Income Annuity,’’ offered by the Irish Life Company of North
America (ILONA), and the second is the ‘‘Inﬂation Linked Bond Account’’
annuity, offered by TIAA-CREF. It is possible that other inﬂation-indexed
products will become available in the future, as insurers adapt to the availability of inﬂation-indexed Treasury bonds. If inﬂation should become a
more substantial concern with consumers, that could also stimulate the
development of inﬂation-indexed products.

The ILONA Real Annuity
Index-linked annuities in the United States are offered by Irish Life PLC, an
international insurance ﬁrm headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, through
the Interstate Assurance Company. Interstate Assurance is a division of Irish
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Table 3. Monthly Payout and Money’s Worth of Nominal and Inﬂation Indexed
Annuities Offered by Irish Life of North America to ∏∑-Year-Olds
Money’s Worth
Monthly
Annuity Payment

Population
Mortality

Annuitant
Mortality

Men
Nominal
Inﬂation Indexed

$π∫∞.πΩ
∑∂∫.∂≤

≠.∫Ω≤
≠.π∂Ω

∞.≠∞≥
≠.∫π∞

Women
Nominal
Inﬂation Indexed

π≠∫.∑π
∂π∑.≤∞

≠.Ω≠∂
≠.π∂∞

≠.Ω∫Ω
≠.∫≤∂

Source: Authors’ tabulations as described in the text. Payouts are for a $∞≠≠,≠≠≠ initial
premium.

Life of North America ((ILONA), a well-rated insurance company. ILONA’s
real annuity product is the ‘‘Freedom CPI Indexed Income Annuity.’’ The
annuity payout for this product rises annually in step with the increase in
the prior year’s CPI. Annuity beneﬁts from the Freedom CPI Indexed Income Annuity cannot decline in nominal terms, even if the CPI were to fall
from year to year. The minimum (maximum) purchase requirement for the
ILONA annuity product is $∞≠,≠≠≠ ($∞ million). The ILONA real annuity
can be purchased as a simple life annuity, as well as with a ‘‘years certain’’
provision, and it can be purchased by an individual or as a joint and survivor
product. Though the ‘‘Freedom CPI Indexed Income Annuity’’ has been
offered by ILONA for two years, as of this writing there have been no buyers
for this product. We are not sure what accounts for the lack of market
interest in this product, or more generally for the apparent lack of interest
on the part of retired households in purchasing assets that offer inﬂation
protection.
In Table ≥ we report the monthly payout and the money’s worth values for
both nominal annuities and inﬂation-indexed annuities offered by ILONA
in April ≤≠≠≠. The payouts on the ILONA inﬂation-linked annuity are ≥≠
(≥≥) percent below those on nominal annuities for men (women). In valuing inﬂation-indexed annuities, we used data on the term structure of yields
on Treasury Inﬂation Protection Securities to discount future cash ﬂows. As
in the calculations reported above, we focus on pretax EPDV calculations.
For the nominal annuities offered by ILONA, we found money’s worth
values of approximately ≠.∫Ω for men, and ≠.Ω≠ for women. These calculations use the population mortality table for individuals turning ∏∑ in ≤≠≠≠.
Using the annuitant mortality table for nominal ILONA annuities yields a
larger value, approximately ∞.≠∞ for men and ≠.ΩΩ for women. For inﬂation-
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linked ILONA annuities, however, we found much smaller values. For example, with population mortality tables, the value was ≠.π∑ for men and ≠.π∂ for
women. One way to interpret these results is to say that purchasing inﬂation
protection adds more than ∞∑ percent to the cost of an annuity policy. The
low demand for the ILONA real annuity may reﬂect the substantial charge
that the insurer levies for providing inﬂation protection.

Annuities Linked to the CREF Index-Linked Bond Account
In May of ∞ΩΩπ, the College Equities Retirement Fund (CREF) launched a
new investment account, the CREF Inﬂation-Linked Bond Account (ILBA).
This new fund was intended to appeal to those saving for retirement as well
as to retirees in the retirement decumulation phase. The fund holds a portfolio that consists primarily of inﬂation-indexed bonds, although it may also
hold other inﬂation-indexed securities. Foreign inﬂation-indexed bonds
cannot account for more than ≤∑ percent of the portfolio. Expenses total ≥∞
basis points annually, lower than many mutual and pension fund expense
levels but comparable to other, more actively managed CREF accounts. The
ILBA has no sales, surrender, or premium charges. The ILBA has grown
slowly since its inception, and it is currently the smallest of the retirement
funds offered by TIAA-CREF. Active participants, rather than retirees, apparently account for most of the funds in the ILBA. This means that the
fund is not used primarily to provide inﬂation-protected retirement annuities, at least at present.
Annuitants intending to use the ILBA to provide an inﬂation-indexed
annuity would purchase a variable annuity, with the payout variation linked
to the performance of the ILBA. Although this ﬁnancial product offers
some inﬂation protection, its protection is incomplete. This is because the
ILBA is marked to market daily, meaning that asset values ﬂuctuate and the
account could lose money. This might occur if real interest rates rose, or if
there were changes in the deﬁnition of the Consumer Price Index. The
mark-to-market feature means that the payouts on a variable annuity that is
linked to the ILBA do not offer a guaranteed real payout stream to prospective annuitants. Another factor that may result in incomplete inﬂation protection arises from the way mortality experience of the annuitant pool affects subsequent payouts. TIAA-CREF annuities place mortality risk for the
annuity pool on the set of participants in the pool, so if there were a substantial and unforecast change in the mortality experience of the annuitant
pool, this would affect payouts.
Fundamental design features of CREF variable annuities backed by the
ILBA raise the possibility that purchasers of such annuities might fail to
keep pace with inﬂation. Any variable annuity is deﬁned by an initial payout
amount, which we shall denote A(O), and an ‘‘updating rule’’ that relates
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the annuity payout in future periods to the previous payout and the intervening returns on the portfolio that backs the variable annuity. To determine A(O), the initial nominal payout per dollar of annuity purchase on a
single-life variable annuity without any guarantee period, the insurance
company solves an equation like

冘
T

(≥)

∞ =

j=∞

A(≠) * Pj
,
(∞ + R )j

where R is the variable annuity’s assumed interest rate (AIR) and T is the
maximum potential lifespan of the annuitant. To determine annuity payouts in subsequent periods, the insurer applies an updating rule related to
the return on the return on the assets that back the annuity (zt ). This
updating rule is
(∂)

A(t + ∞) = A(t ) *

∞ + zt
∞+R

.

The AIR is a key design parameter for a variable annuity. Assuming a high
value enables an insurance company to offer a large initial premium, but,
for any underlying portfolio, the stream of future payouts will be more likely
to decline as the assumed value rises. Equation (∂) clearly indicates that an
individual who purchases a variable annuity will receive payouts that ﬂuctuate with the nominal value of the underlying portfolio.
All CREF variable annuities use an AIR of ∂ percent. Thus when the unit
value of the investment account underlying the variable annuity rises by less
than ∂ percent, the nominal payout on the variable annuity declines. When
the nominal return on the underlying assets exceeds this rate, the variable
annuity payout rises. The assumption of a ∂ percent AIR makes it possible
for the nominal payout on the CREF ILBA variable annuity to decline over
time. Consider the experience of ∞ΩΩ∫, when the total return (after expenses) on the ILBA account was ≥.∂∫ percent. Given the AIR of ∂ percent,
annuities backed by this portfolio had to reduce their nominal payout by
≠.∑≤ percent. This reduction in nominal payout took place at a time when
the price level was rising, so the CREF ILBA variable annuity did not deliver
a constant real payout stream.
In order to avoid the situation that occurred in ∞ΩΩ∫, it would be necessary for the returns on Treasury Inﬂation Protection Securities to exceed ∂
percent. The CREF variable payout annuity linked to the ILBA would be
more likely to deliver a future real payout stream if the Air on this annuity
were set equal to the real interest rate on long-term TIPS at the time when
the annuity is purchased. In this case, the return on the bond portfolio
would typically equal the AIR plus the annual inﬂation rate, leaving aside
some of the other risks of holding indexed bonds.
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Equity-Linked Annuity Products
One recent development in the U.S. annuity market is the rise of products
known as ‘‘equity linked annuities.’’ These products make use of stock-index
options to expand the menu of risk/return choices open to investors. As explained by Bodie (∞ΩΩΩ), index options make it possible to combine downside protection with some upside gain potential tied to the performance of
an underlying index portfolio, essentially providing a guaranteed income
‘‘ﬂoor.’’ In practice, U.S. equity-linked annuities typically invest most of the
annuity premium in a traditional ﬁxed nominal annuity and the remainder
in a portfolio of options on stock market indices. A common division is to
place Ω≠ percent of the assets in a ﬁxed annuity, and to invest ∞≠ percent in
call options on the S&P ∑≠≠ index. By splitting the investment this way, an
annuity buyer will never receive less than the payouts from a ﬁxed annuity
that he could have purchased with Ω≠ percent of the initial premium. If the
equity market rises enough that the index exceeds the exercise price on the
option, then the call option is ‘‘in the money,’’ and thus provides additional
resources to increase future annuity payments.
Bodie (∞ΩΩΩ) offers a useful illustration of this approach for an individual
with $∞ million who is assumed to live another ≤≠ years. With a risk-free
interest rate of ≥.∑ percent, the individual could purchase a real annuity that
pays $∏π,≤∞∏ per year. If, instead, the individual invested only Ω≠ percent in a
real annuity and the other ∞≠ percent in a series of ≤≠ index options of
increasing maturity, the minimum amount received would be $∏≠,∂Ω∂. Assuming that the exercise price on the options are set equal to the value of
the index at the time the annuity is purchased, and assuming an annualized
volatility of the stock index of ≠.≤, this individual would receive an additional $∞≥,∞∫∫ for every percentage increase in the index. By increasing the
fraction of wealth invested in the call options, one reduces the guaranteed
income ﬂoor but increases the rate at which the individual participates in
the upside potential of the index.
Equity-linked annuities were introduced in ∞ΩΩ∑. The marketing materials for these products suggest that they provide purchasers with some
degree of inﬂation protection, because their payouts are partly related to
stock market returns. (A similar argument could be made for investing in
traditional variable annuities with the underlying assets invested in a broadbased portfolio of common stocks.) Whether an equity portfolio really offers an inﬂation hedge depends on investor’s planning horizon. Brown,
Mitchell, and Poterba (≤≠≠∞) present evidence showing that the U.S. stock
market has historically not provided a good inﬂation hedge at short horizons. In the long run, however, Boudoukh and Richardson (∞ΩΩ≥) and
others have argued that equities may offer some degree of inﬂation protection. This debate notwithstanding, it is clear that equity-linked annuity
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products do not offer potential annuitants a payout stream guaranteed to
retain a constant purchasing power in all future years.

International Evidence on Annuity Products
Our analysis so far has focused on annuity products available in the United
States. But there are also annuity markets in other countries, and in some
cases these markets are substantially larger than those in the United States.
This is particularly true with regard to markets for inﬂation-protected annuities. In this section we offer a brief overview of recent cross-national
evidence on the money’s worth of both nominal and inﬂation-indexed single premium immediate annuities.
Comparisons of annuity market operations across countries pose several
challenges. One is that annuity pricing data are often difﬁcult to obtain,
though an important effort in this direction was recently undertaken for a
World Bank project summarized by James and Vittas (∞ΩΩΩ). Another problem is that insurers in other countries often lack country-speciﬁc mortality
tables, and hence they must rely on some adaptation of the U.S. or UK
mortality tables. Which they choose will matter, as a glance at Figure ≤
conﬁrms. When mortality patterns are not well known, insurers may build in
additional reserves to cover eventualities. McCarthy and Mitchell (≤≠≠∞)
argue that these additional reserves have the effect of making the annuity
streams less valuable to purchasers, because they reduce the money’s worth
of annuity products.
Finally, computing the money’s worth of annuities requires obtaining
either a government Treasury yield curve or the relevant corporate yield
curve, either of which can be difﬁcult to obtain, particularly in developing
economies. It is also not clear whether insurance companies selling annuity
products in emerging nations are actually investing a substantial fraction of
the assets that back these annuities in the domestic bond market. These
operational difﬁculties in annuity valuation underscore the need for further
data collection and reﬁnement in the annuity valuation process.

International Comparisons of the Money’s Worth of Nominal Annuities
James and Vittas (∞ΩΩΩ) present evidence on the money’s worth of nominal
annuities in ﬁve countries. Table ∂ reproduces their central results. The
table refers to single premium immediate nominal annuities for ∏∑-year old
men or women; James and Vittas (∞ΩΩΩ) provide information for other
potential annuitants as well.≤
The results in Table ∂ suggest that money’s worth ratios for nominal
annuities in the countries surveyed are rather high. All the money’s worth
values are at least ≠.∫∑. Nevertheless, the values frequently exceed ≠.Ω≠ and

Figure ≤. U.S. and UK annuitant mortality. Source: Authors’ calculations following MPWB (∞ΩΩΩ) for U.S.
and Finkelstein and Poterba (∞ΩΩΩ) for UK.
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Table 4. International Comparisons of Money’s Worth Values for Single Premium Nominal
Life Annuities Offered to ∏∑-Year-Olds
Annuitant
Sex
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Female

Mortality
Table

Term
Structure

UK

Australia

Canada

Switzerland

Singapore

Population
Population
Annuitant
Annuitant
Population
Population
Annuitant
Annuitant

Treasury
Corporate
Treasury
Corporate
Treasury
Corporate
Treasury
Corporate

≠.∫Ωπ
≠.∫∑∂
≠.Ω∏∏
≠.Ω∞∏
≠.Ω∞≠
≠.∫∏≠
≠.Ω∑π
≠.Ω≠∞

≠.Ω∞∂
≠.∫∂∏
≠.Ω∫∏
≠.Ω≠∏
≠.Ω∞∂
≠.∫∂∏
≠.Ωπ≠
≠.Ω≠∏

≠.Ω≤∑
≠.∫∏Ω
∞.≠∞∂
≠.Ω∂π
≠.Ω≥π
≠.∫π∂
∞.≠∞∑
≠.Ω∂∞

≠.Ω∏∑
≠.Ω≤≤
∞.∞∞π
∞.∞∞
∞.≠≤Ω
≠.Ωπ∂
∞.∞∞∑
∞.≠∫≥

NA
NA
∞.≤∑∏
∞.≠π≥
NA
NA
NA
∞.≠∑∫

Source: James and Vittas (∞ΩΩΩ).

sometimes are greater than ∞.≠ for computations involving annuitant mortality tables (particularly with the lower Treasury discount rates). This latter
ﬁnding is surprising since it implies that purchasers receive more, in an
expected value sense, than the premium they pay for the product. We are
skeptical of results that suggest money’s worth values of more than unity,
and we suspect that insurers offering these annuities do not price using
Treasury rates, or that the annuitant mortality tables that are used to calculate the EPDV of annuity payouts are not the ones used by insurance companies selling these products. While further work is clearly needed, the key
ﬁndings also indicate that annuity offerings elsewhere are not inferior to
offerings in the United States, at least when measured by money’s worth
ratios.

International Comparisons of Inflation-Indexed Annuity Products
Inﬂation-indexed annuity products are offered in several countries, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel, Mexico, and Chile. Information
about these annuities is even more difﬁcult to obtain, however, than data on
nominal annuities. Table ∑ summarizes the available information for the
UK, Chile, and Israel, focusing on inﬂation-indexed products for ∏∑-year old
men and women.
Overall, the money’s worth values for the real annuity products appear
lower than for the nominal products, a pattern consistent with our ﬁndings
for the United States and with the results in Finkelstein and Poterba (∞ΩΩΩ)
and Murthi, Orszag, and Orszag (∞ΩΩΩ) for the United Kingdom. However
the gap between real and nominal annuities is smaller in countries other
than the United States. This is particularly evident in the U.K., where real
annuities have been sold for many years. The difference in money’s worth
values for real and nominal annuities in this case is only on the order of ∑
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Table 5. International Comparisons of Money’s Worth Values for Single Premium
Inﬂation-Indexed Life Annuities Offered to ∏∑-Year-Olds
Annuitant
Sex
Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Female

Mortality
Table

Term
Structure

UK

Chile

Israel

Population
Population
Annuitant
Annuitant
Population
Population
Annuitant
Annuitant

Treasury
Corporate
Treasury
Corporate
Treasury
Corporate
Treasury
Corporate

≠.∫≠∞
≠.π∑∏
≠.∫π∫
≠.∫≤≥
≠.πΩ∫
≠.π∂∑
≠.∫∑≠
≠.πΩ∞

≠.∫∏∫
≠.∫≠≤
≠.Ω≥Ω
≠.∫∏≥
≠.∫∏∏
≠.π∫∫
≠.Ω∂π
≠.∫∑Ω

≠.πΩΩ
≠.π∂≤
≠.Ω≤∞
≠.∫∂π
≠.π∏≠
≠.π≠≥
≠.Ω∞∞
≠.∫≥

Source: James and Vittas (∞ΩΩΩ).

percent. Why there is such limited demand for real annuities in the United
States, and why the available inﬂation-linked products are priced so unfavorably relative to nominal products, remains an open issue for further study.

Conclusions and Discussion
Our analysis of annuity markets in the United States and our review of
evidence on annuity markets in other nations suggests several broad conclusions. First, the present discounted value of annuity payouts typically falls
below the cost of these products by between ∞≠ and ≤≠ percent for a randomly selected person in the population. For typical annuity buyers, however, the expected present value of the payouts is much closer to the purchase price of the annuity. Differences in prospective mortality experience
between typical annuity buyers and individuals in the population at large,
what we call ‘‘adverse selection,’’ therefore may explain a substantial share
of the effective cost of an annuity for a randomly selected individual.
Second, the money’s worth of nominal annuities exceeds the money’s
worth of inﬂation-indexed annuities both in the United States, where only
one ‘‘inﬂation-indexed’’ annuity product has been brought to market thus
far, and in other countries, where there are more active markets for real
annuities. This is true even though insurance companies may have access to
bond markets in which they can purchase inﬂation-indexed government
securities. The gap in money’s worth values is smaller in the more established markets.
Third, the operation of annuity markets in the United States does not
appear to differ in signiﬁcant ways from the operation of annuity markets in
other nations, at least given current evidence. Money’s worth values for
nominal annuities offered in a range of different nations are remarkably

Mortality Risk, Inflation Risk, and Annuity Products

195

similar. This conclusion must be qualiﬁed, however, by the recognition that
past studies have made strong assumptions to obtain the necessary mortality
data and interest rate data for annuity valuation in countries other than the
United States and the United Kingdom.
The research presented here raises a number of issues for further study.
One is why consumers do not place greater value on inﬂation-indexed annuity products, and why the demand for these products is not greater than it
currently appears to be, particularly in the United States. It is possible that
investors do not understand the meaning of, and the substantial value of,
inﬂation protection. Another possibility is that inﬂation-protected securities, bonds as well as annuities, are still novel products, and it will take time
for these products to attract a substantial following among the investing
public.
A second issue requiring further study concerns the relationship between
planned and actual annuitization on the part of households with signiﬁcant
retirement resources. Surveys of households that are still several years away
from retirement suggest that many people plan to annuitize a part of their
ﬁnancial portfolio at retirement. Whether these households’ plans are
borne out remains to be seen, and this will play a critical role in affecting the
future size of the annuity market. If there are ﬁxed costs of operating an
annuity market, then it is possible that the effective cost of annuities for
prospective buyers will decline as the size of the potential market expands.
A third important issue concerns group annuities. Limits on data availability led us to concentrate on individually purchased annuities for this
research, yet little is currently known about the market for group annuities.
It may be that in the future, employers will negotiate arrangements with
annuity providers that will permit their employees to annuitize their retirement resources in a group setting. This may reduce the evident disparities
between the mortality experience of the annuitant pool and of the population at large.

Notes
The authors are grateful to Amy Finkelstein and Mark Warshawsky for helpful
discussions, to Soojin Yim and David McCarthy for research assistance, and to
Joseph Bellerson for kindly providing data. We thank the National Institute on
Aging (Brown and Poterba), the Pension Research Council at the Wharton School
(Mitchell), and the National Science Foundation (Poterba) for research support.
Opinions are solely those of the authors.
∞. McGill et al. (∞ΩΩ∏) summarize the regulations that govern qualiﬁed plans.
Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (∞ΩΩΩ) analyze the tax treatment of distributions from qualiﬁed and nonqualiﬁed plans.
≤. There are important institutional details that affect the analysis of each country’s annuity market. For example, in the United Kingdom, the information in Table
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∂ refers only to the ‘‘voluntary’’ annuity market. As Finkelstein and Poterba (∞ΩΩΩ)
explain, there is also an active ‘‘compulsory’’ annuity market in the UK, where
individuals who have accumulated assets in a set of tax-favored self-directed retirement plans are required to annuitize a share of their assets.
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